Archive for Theology

Imago Dei as a Prism

Given the various interpretations of what it means for mankind to bear the image of God, the imago dei, I think the suggestion of William P. Brown, Professor of Old Testament at Columbia Theological Seminary, is particularly helpful for warding off the fallacy of the excluded middle. Otherwise, you will likely find yourself vacillating theologically between each interpretation as you hear it put forward in the commentaries and literature. We should be cautious if something as complex as the imago dei is simplified.

Our species-specificity operates on a number of different levels, so also God’s specificity. Thus, it is best to think of the imago Dei not as something that reflects a singular aspect of the divine off a singular aspect of the human but as a prism refracting the various ways human beings, beginning with their gendered diversity, are capable of conveying the manifold character of God in the world.1

Prisma
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  1. William P. Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation: The Bible, Science, and the Ecology of Wonder (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 76.
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Worship Has a Moral Aspect

Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, on the connection of sabbath and worship with creation:

The Bible, to be sure, could take up the fundamental notion of the universe as existing for the sake of worship, but at the same time it had to purify it. This idea is to be found there, as has already been said, in the context of the sabbath. The Bible declares that creation has its structure in the sabbath ordinace. But the sabbath is in its turn the summing up of Torah, the law of Israel. This means that worship has a moral aspect to it. God’s whole moral order has been taken up into it; only thus is it truly worship. To this must be added the fact that Torah, the law, is an expression of Israel’s history with God. It is an expression of the covenant, and the covenant is in turn an expression of God’s love, of his “yes” to the human being that he created, so that he could both love and receive love.1

  1. Joseph Ratzinger, ‘In the Beginning…’: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall, Ressourcement, trans. Boniface Ramsey, O.P. (Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1995), 29.
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Teleology to Protology: Reasoning from Metonymy in Hebrews

“…Hebrews’ protological language in relation to Christ is largely metonymic; that is, Hebrews associates Christ with the creation of the world because the telos of the world is fulfilled in Christ’s establishment of God’s rule on earth as it is in heaven.”1

Interesting to reason from a figure of speech: Christ associated with end-goal of world (telos) therefore also with its beginning.

(Sorry for the wordy, pretentious title.)

A Little Perspective
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  1. Kenneth L. Schenck, “The Worship of Jesus among Early Christians: The Evidence of Hebrews,” in Jesus and Paul: Global Perspectives in Honor of James D. G. Dunn. A Festschrift for his 70th Birthday, Library of New Testament Studies 414, ed. Mark Goodacre (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 118.
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Imputation Makes Righteous

Dikaioo means “to declare righteous” not “to make righteous.” This is accepted by two theologians on either side of the New Perspective discussion, N. T. Wright1 and Robert L. Reymond.2

“Leon Morris points out that ‘verbs ending in [-oo] and referring to moral qualities have a declarative sense; they do not mean “to make __.”‘”3 Therefore Reymond willingly concedes that justification is “an objective forensic judgment.”4

Where’s Room for Imputation?

How then can definitions of justification contain “make” language as one finds in definitions that include imputation of Christ’s righteousness? Consider how Reymond characterizes justification (emphasis original; red text mine):

“[J]ustification refers to God’s wholly objective, wholly forensic judgment concerning the sinner’s standing before the law, by which forensic judgment God declares that the sinner is righteous in his sight because of the imputation of his sin to Christ, on which ground he is pardoned, and the imputation of Christ’s perfect obedience to him, on which ground he is constituted righteous before God.”5

“Constituted righteous”? Here constitutive, or “make” language as I’ll call it, creeps in, subsumed under declaration justification. Reymond’s next sentences are helpful for further elucidating this point (emphasis original; red text mine):

“In other words, ‘for the one who does not work, but believes in him who justifies the ungodly’ (Rom. 4:5), God pardons him of all his sins (Acts 10:43; Rom. 4:6-7) and constitutes him righteous by imputing or reckoning the righteousness of Christ to him (Rom. 5:1, 19; 2 Cor. 5:21). And on the basis of his constituting the ungodly man righteous by his act of imputation, God simultaneously declares the ungodly man to be righteous in his sight.”6

Here Reymond is clearly defining justification as containing a declarative action and a constitutive action when on the very next page he will approvingly cite Leon Morris’ conclusion that dikaioo and verbs like it “have a declarative sense [and] they do not mean ‘to make’.”

Where’s room for the constitutive language of imputation on this understanding of dikaioo?

Imputation in Rome

If when in Rome one is does as the Romans, imputation is in Rome because it is doing as the Romans.

Reymond repeatedly writes that “justification is an objective forensic judgment, as opposed to a subjective transformation” and backs it up with Deut. 25:1, Job 32:2, Proverbs 17:15, and Luke 7:29.7 He’s attempting to distance the Reformed position as far as possible from “Rome’s tragically defective representation.”8

But how is imputation not also “subjective” as Reymond classifies the Roman Catholic understanding of justification which holds to infused righteousness? Imputed and infused are both “subjective,” a understanding that goes against Morris’ definition of dikaioo.

Wright on Dikaioo

Augustine interpreted “justify” as “make righteous.” “That always meant, for Augustine and his followers, that God, in justification, was actually transforming the character of the person. . . .”9

Let me just let Wright continue in his own style and words with what he’s saying (emphasis original):

“The result was a subtle but crucial shifting of metaphors: the lawcourt scene is now replaced with a medical one, a kind of remedial spiritual surgery, involving a ‘righteousness implant’ which, like an artificial heart, begins to enable the patient to do things previously impossible.

“But part of Paul’s own language, rightly stressed by those who have analyzed the verb dikaioo, “to justify,” is that it does not denote an action which transforms someone so much as a declaration which grants them a status. It is the status of the person which is transformed by the action of ‘justification,’ not the character. It is in this sense that ‘justification’ ‘makes’ someone ‘righteous,’ just as the officiant at a wedding serve be said to ‘make’ the couple husband and wife . . . .”10

In other words, Wright is reiterating the point that justification with a right understanding of dikaioo describes a verdict rather surgery. Imputation like infusion both seem to be surgery.

Feedback

Am I missing something?

Courtroom One Gavel
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  1. N. T. Wright, Justification (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 91.
  2. Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998), 743.
  3. Ibid., 743, citing Leon Morris, New Testament Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Academie, 1986), 70.
  4. Ibid., 743.
  5. Ibid., 742, emphasis original.
  6. Ibid., 742, emphasis original.
  7. Ibid., 743-744.
  8. Ibid., 741.
  9. Wright, Justification, 91.
  10. Ibid., 91.
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No Evil for You

There’s something snide about attempting to rebut a charge of incompatibility between God and evil with, “How do you know what evil is? You have no basis on which to call something evil, if you don’t believe in God.” Of course, the rebuttal is trying to show that a concept of evil and making moral judgments using it make sense only if one has a standard of good to measure up against (i.e., God). True enough, but are people of whatever (non-)religious ilk not permitted to peer into the Christian “system” and bring up an apparent contradiction for discussion? Certainly they should be allowed and even encouraged to do so without expecting to receive snide and shallow rebuttals that amount to little more than question dodging.

everyone knows everyone from flickr
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Justin Martyr on Imputation

I’m on somewhat of a mission to explore the New Perspective on Paul and evaluate specifically the claims of N. T. Wright concerning imputation of righteousness from Christ to believers. Recently I checked out J. V. Fesko’s Justification: Understanding the Classic Reformed Doctrine from the library and started reading it last night. The first chapter is devoted to “Justification in Church History.”

Earlier on Fesko quotes Justin Martyr, saying:

“We also find Justin Martyr affirming the idea of the imputation of righteousness in justification: ‘For the goodness and loving-kindness of God, and His boundless riches, hold righteous and sinless the man who, as Ezekiel tells, repents of sins; and reckon sinful, unrighteous, and impious the man who falls away from piety and righteousness to unrighteousness and ungodliness.’”1

I, however, fail to find any explicit reference to imputation in the words of Justin. “Hold righteous and sinless the man…” is the closest I see, but even there one must make an inferential jump to assume that imputation of righteousness was what Justin had in mind as to how God can hold one righteousness and sinless.

As far as I can tell Fesko’s use of the quote is unwarranted and far from buttressing “the classic Reformed doctrine” of justification. Was denkst du?

  1. Fesko, Justification (P&R, 2008), 8. There’s a footnote at the end of the quotation which cites Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 47, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, 1:218-19.
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Book Review: In the Beginning Was the Word

There are very few books that I look forward to reading. I mean really look forward to, like the way a tweenie looks forward to the next Twilight. Though not so much interested in adolescent vampire fiction there was one book published at the end of last year that I couldn’t wait to sink my teeth into: Vern Poythress’ In the Beginning Was the Word: A God-Centered Approach to Language. (You can grab a free PDF of the entire book through Poythress’ site.)

Having come through the undergraduate linguistics program of a state school I can tell you that the last thing you’re going to hear in any linguistics classroom is a God-centered approach to language. The only mention of God you’re likely to hear is a confused reference to Genesis 11 and the tower of Babel. Linguistics is very much a natural science.

This is why I greatly anticipated Poythress’ work. If well-done, this book could be a valuable contribution to the field of linguistics and give voice to an alternative viewpoint that’s all too often not even considered. A God-centered approach to language makes sense given that the universe itself is God-centered, something most Christians will willingly concede over against a strictly naturalistic cosmology. Also, there’s a certain apologetic force to a God-centered approach to language that could really put a pebble in the shoe of the relatively unchallenged notion that language is the happy result of evolutionary processes. Yes, there is something inexplicably preternatural about language that points to the triune God.

Poythress in In the Beginning Was the Word, however, fails to harness the full force of the sleeping beast on which he rides. All in all I was greatly disappointed by In the Beginning Was the Word and would be surprised to find it having a lasting impression on the field of linguistics outside of Christian circles and even within. We need a book like this, but we need it to do more, and to do it more convincingly.

In the Beginning Was the Word

First

First, I was disappointed that in the book Poythress fails to interact with contemporary linguists and linguistic theory, not merely because this is the kind of thing that good scholars do, but more so because I believe there’s much in contemporary linguistics that could be used to bolster support for Poythress’ argument that a divine origin of language has more explanatory power than the strictly naturalistic explanations that prevail today. It should go without saying that a book published today on language should interact with Chomskyian linguistics, especially a work that bears much in common with and could find much support from his nativist approach to language. Chomsky has been called a “closet creationist” for instance. Steven Pinker in his The Language Instinct has to go to some surprising lengths to try to convince his readers that universal grammar is still compatible with the theory of evolution and that people needn’t run hastily to God for answers. This seems like an appropriate place for someone like Poythress to step into the discussion and proffer God. Instead, In the Beginning Was the Word strips itself of much of its potential power by not taking a broader look at what a God-centered approach language entails. Poythress commendably reasons from the Scriptures but in only doing so he fails to employ all available arguments for a God-centered approach to language. So much more could be said that the book’s almost a frustrating read.

Second

Secondly, prior to reading I had in mind to offer the book as a giveaway at a linguistics meeting on campus I was planning and even possibly to send a copy to one of my old college linguistics professors. After reading, I felt uneasy doing so and thereby endorsing the book for the simple reason that the argumentation within is incredibly weak. For example, consider the analogies Poythress attempts to draw between language and the triune God in order to establish the thesis that a biblically-faithful approach to language will start with communication between the persons of the trinity:

Let us now focus on the character of the rules of language. They reveal God in some striking ways.

First, the rules of English hold wherever English is spoken…Spoken English, and human knowledge of English, are not omnipresent. But the rules are.1

In the above language is thought to reveal God on the following logic: God is omnipresent. Rules of language can be thought of as omnipresent. Rules of language therefore reveal God. I don’t find this as striking as the author does. It could be argued on this thinking that whatever is omnipresent “reveals God.” Seems like a stretch to me.

The author continues this way showing rules of language to be omnipresent, eternal, immutable, invisible (“We do not literally see the rule that ‘moved’ is the past tense of ‘move.’ We see and hear only the effects of the rule on our use of language. The rule is essentially immaterial and invisible . . . Likewise, God is essentially immaterial and invisible, but is known through his acts in the world.”2), truthful (“Real rules, as opposed to linguists’ approximations of them, are also absolutely, infallibly true. Truthfulness is also an attribute of God.”3), powerful, immanent and transcendent, rational, good, and beautiful.

Then watch his conclusion to this chapter:

“Rules for language are a form of the word of God. So they reflect the Trinitarian statement of John 1:1, which identifies the second person of the Trinity as the eternal Word. . . .

Man is made in the image of God, and so his language is in the image of God. And so his language reflects the Trinitarian pattern.”4

I find this argument very unsatisfying for two reasons: (1) again it seems like a stretch and (2) so what? What’s the importance? It seems to me to belabor the thesis to multiple evidences by stretching analogies. The thesis is straightforward enough that in my mind little is gained by the above evidences.

Third

Third, I have a very hard time swallowing many basic statements in the book that attribute to God everything from etymology to grammar to the correspondence between the signified (a dog) and the signifier (“dog”). Are we only able to trust language if we endow words with a logical, God-established connection to the thing for which they stand? I think not. Again, I see little gained when Poythress asserts that God has designed the contemporary English word “dog” to represent perfectly the idea of a dog. I see no need to be this specific in a God-centered approach to language, especially on a matter on which we cannot be certain (regardless of the view of divine providence one subscribes to). I see no damage done to a God-centered approach to language by granting the abstract relationship between words and concepts.

Additionally, denying the abstract relationship between what we call a dog and the English word “dog” flies in the face of every and any linguistics book you’re likely to come across. Fair enough they are not working from a God-centered approach to language, but I’ve yet to come across any linguist finding rational links between signifier and signified (the small number of onomatopoeia excepted of course), something one would expect if indeed God has linked them together on rational grounds. Therein would lie great apologetic force if such a link could be observed. We must, however, look elsewhere for hints of God in language.

Fourth

Seventy-five percent of the book is only tangentially related to language or linguistics. Of the six parts, the book could conceivably be condensed down to the first section (pp. 1-78), the sixth section (pp. 289-297) and the appendices. The rest is largely unnecessary, especially part two.

Conclusion

I hope I have not been too harsh in offering my thoughts on In the Beginning Was the Word. If I am wrong or misinformed or misguided on any of the above, I will gladly and humbly lend my ear to the many whose understanding on the subject surpasses my own. As I have not come across any reviews of the work I hoped to present my thoughts in order to offer some follow up to the hype the book enjoyed in the weeks leading up to its publication. Finally, if I come across as harsh, it’s only because I had high expectations for this work.

Call for Review

In the interest of fairness I want to do something a bit different. If you are a linguist and have not read In the Beginning Was the Word and would like to read it and review it, I will send you my copy for free. You must only agree to read it, review it, and have your review published on my blog. Easy enough, right? But, if you’re a linguist and you’ve already read it, I’m still interested in your thoughts and/or review, although nothing free for you.

  1. Vern Sheridan Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word: A God-Centered Approach to Language (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009), 64-65.
  2. Ibid., 68.
  3. Ibid., 69.
  4. Ibid., 77.
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Carols after Christmas

 Jesus is born . . .
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We woke up yesterday and went to church here in Williamsburg where we’re vacationing for the week. I employed the best method possible in finding a solid, evangelical church to worship at on the Lord’s Day: the phone book. Flipping through, we had an extended list of almost every conceivable denomination. We decided that we wanted to do something a bit different and go to a service at a denomination of church that none of us had ever visited.

I was immediately partial to a Coptic Orthodox church, but my sister-in-law wasn’t so sure about the possibility of incense. I then suggested we go Presbyterian. Still, so many to choose from. Is it the PCA or PCUSA that are the more evangelical, missions-minded denomination? We went with a good orthodox sounding name:  Grace Covenant. We like grace and I’m interested in covenant theology. It seemed like a good fit.

Great service. I was struck by, and this is the main purpose of this post, the singing of carols after Christmas. All except for one of the songs sung yesterday morning were Christmas carols. They’re hymns nonetheless, but they’re primarily now known as Christmas carols.

Doesn’t it make all the sense in the world to sing most of our carols after Christmas rather than before? They tell of the newborn babe lying in a manger. If the purpose of Christmas is to re-live the advent of the Savior, then the month leading up to the Day should be spent reading prophecy and the opening chapters of Matthew and Luke, stopping short of the actual birth narratives. The songs sung should be sung to match. Instead, we sing of the Savior’s birth before we celebrate it happening. Yesterday morning, it was refreshing to reflect on the birth of Savior through Christmas carols after we had celebrated it–or should have–on Christmas Day.

There is so much theology packed into these carol-hymns. Check out the last verse of Hark, the Herald Angels Sing:

Adam’s likeness, Lord, efface,
Stamp Thine image in its place:
Second Adam from above,
Reinstate us in Thy love.
Let us Thee, though lost, regain,
Thee, the Life, the inner man:
O, to all Thyself impart,
Formed in each believing heart.

Let’s spend the month of January singing about the new-born King rather than jumping straight to Easter.

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Moses Infant Narrative as a Type of Exodus

It was all yellow...
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Exodus 3:8 (RSV)

I have come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with milk and honey, to the place of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites.

Exodus 2:5-10 (RSV)

Now the daughter of Pharaoh came down to bathe at the river, and her maidens walked beside the river; she saw the basket among the reeds and sent her maid to fetch it. 6 When she opened it she saw the child; and lo, the babe was crying. She took pity on him and said, “This is one of the Hebrews’ children.” 7 Then his sister said to Pharaoh’s daughter, “Shall I go and call you a nurse from the Hebrew women to nurse the child for you?” 8 And Pharaoh’s daughter said to her, “Go.” So the girl went and called the child’s mother. 9 And Pharaoh’s daughter said to her, “Take this child away, and nurse him for me, and I will give you your wages.” So the woman took the child and nursed him. 10 And the child grew, and she brought him to Pharaoh’s daughter, and he became her son; and she named him Moses, for she said, “Because I drew him out of the water.”

Coming down, seeing, taking out of current affliction, bringing up into luxurious foreign land (Pharaoh’s household for the infant). Similarities notwithstanding, the lexical parallelism is largely lacking in the Hebrew; still found it interesting.

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Our Father Adam’s Abdication Crisis

King of the Woods
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Edward VIII was an unlikely third Adam.

In December 1936 Edward VIII, King of England for less than a year, chose to abdicate his place as king in order to marry American socialite Wallis Simpson.

Our first father Adam similarly abdicated his throne to chase after a forbidden love.

Christ temporarily abdicated his to win a people for himself, fallen kings.

Doesn’t your unhappiness point to a previous kingship? Pascal thinks so.

Who would indeed think himself unhappy not to be king except one who had been dispossessed?

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